Abstract-The two-user multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian broadcast channel with common, private, and confidential messages is considered. The transmitter sends a common message to both users, a confidential message to the User 1 and a private (non-confidential) message to the User 2. The secrecy-capacity region is characterized by showing that certain inner and outer bounds coincide and that the boundary points are achieved by Gaussian inputs, which enables the development of a tight converse. The proof relies on the factorization of upper concave envelopes and a variant of dirty-paper coding (DPC). It is shown that the entire region is exhausted by using DPC to cancel out the signal of the non-confidential message at Receiver 1, thus making DPC against the signal of the confidential message unnecessary. A numerical example illustrates the secrecy-capacity results.
I. INTRODUCTION
A DDITIVE Gaussian channels are a common model for wireless communication, whose open nature makes it vulnerable to a variety of security threats, such as eavesdropping. However, eavesdroppers are not always a malicious entity from which all transmissions are concealed. Rather, a legitimate recipient of one message may serve as an eavesdropper for other messages. We encapsulate this notion in a two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) with common, private and confidential messages (Fig. 1) . The common message M 0 is intended to both users, while M 1 and M 2 are private messages that are sent to User 1 and User 2, respectively. Furthermore, M 1 is confidential and is kept secret from User 2. Many real-life scenarios fall within this framework. One such example is a banking site that simultaneously: (i) broadcasts an advertisement to all online users (modeled by M 0 ); (ii) offers public information (such as material on different banking programs, reports, forecasts, etc.) that is available only to users that are interested in it (modeled by the private message M 2 ); and (iii) provides an online banking service, by which users can access their account and perform transactions (this confidential information is modeled by M 1 ). Furthermore, 5th generation (5G) mobile technology [1] puts significant emphasis on advanced MIMO capabilities and multiuser communication.
In particular, schemes supporting multiple users exchanging various kinds of information over a MIMO communication system (and their fundamental limits) are of great interest. The studied MIMO Gaussian BC is an instance of a system where these aspects are jointly incorporated.
In recent years, information-theoretic security over MIMO communication systems has been an active field of research (see [2] for a recent survey of progress in this area). Most noticeably, the secrecy-capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel (WTC) was characterized in [3] - [5] for the multipleinput single-output scenario, and in [6] - [10] for the MIMO case. The Gaussian MIMO WTC with a common message was studied in [11] . In [12] , the secrecy-capacity region for the setting with a degraded message set and an external eavesdropper (from which all messages are concealed) was derived. The MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages, in which the private message to each user is kept secret from the opposite user, without and with a common message, was solved in [13] and [14] , respectively. As the capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC without secrecy requirements was derived in [15] with no common message present, and in [16] 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. with a common message, this work settles the two remaining scenarios concerning secrecy. More specifically, focusing on the two-user MIMO Gaussian BC with or without a common message and where both, either or neither of the private messages are secret, we derive the secrecy-capacity regions of the only two instances that remained unsolved until now. A pointer to each past result and the contribution of this work are found in Table I . Up until the more recent work of Geng and Nair [16] , all the aforementioned results established the optimality of Gaussian inputs based on channel enhancement arguments, originally used in [15] to characterize the private message capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC (without secrecy constraints). In a nutshell, the idea of [15] was to approximate the actual BC using enhanced BCs, for which the entropy power inequality applies and is invoked to establish the optimality of Gaussian inputs (similarly to the proof for the scalar case by Bergmans [17] ). Continuity arguments are then used to characterize the capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC of interest. The limitation of the channel enhancement technique seems to be the difficulty in generalizing it to account for both private and common messages. Attempted adaptations of this technique to scenarios comprising common and private messages include, e.g., [18] and [19] , where generally unmatching inner and outer bounds or constant gapfrom-capacity results were derived for the MIMO Gaussian BC without and with security requirements, respectively.
Our goal is to fully characterize the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages and show that it is attained by Gaussian inputs. Since channel enhancement arguments are insufficient for this purpose, we adopt the approach of [16] for proving the optimality of Gaussians via factorization of upper concave envelopes (UCEs). We start by characterizing the secrecycapacity region under an input covariance constraint for the setting with private and confidential messages only (i.e., when no common message is present). The derivation first describes the boundary points of a certain outer bound on the secrecy-capacity region as an UCE of a function of the input distribution. With this result at hand, we show that if this UCE satisfies a specific factorization property, then it is maximized by a Gaussian input distribution. Then, using an adaptation of dirty-paper coding (DPC) [20] , we establish the equivalence of the outer bound to a particular inner bound, thus characterizing the secrecy-capacity region. Interestingly, optimality is achieved by using DPC to cancel out the signal of the non-confidential message M 2 at Receiver 1 only. The other variant, i.e., DPC against the signal of the confidential message M 1 , turns out to be unnecessary. This is in contrast to the case without secrecy requirements [16] , in which both variants of DPC are necessary to exhaust the entire region.
We then focus on the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages ( Fig. 1 ) and derive our main result by characterizing its secrecy-capacity region. Although this is a generalization of the problem without a common message, the secrecy-capacity of the latter setting is solved first. In doing so, we use the result without a common message to show that Gaussian inputs are optimal for a certain portion of the region with a common message. The rest of the region is characterized by extending the tools from [16] and introducing the notion of a double-nested UCE. Gaussian inputs once again are shown to attain optimality. Finally, we visualize our results by a numerical example. Since the obtained regions are described as non-convex matrix optimization problems, we convert them into a computationally efficient form by relying on matrix decomposition properties from [21] .
Organization: The UCE factorization method introduced in [16] and further developed in this work relies on rather heavy machinery and many technical functional analysis results. The proofs of our main secrecy-capacity theorems (i.e., without and with a common message) frequently refer to these auxiliary results while also relying on additional information-theoretic arguments (e.g., DPC). In structuring this paper, it was important for us to distill the informationtheoretic arguments from the functional analysis aspects of this work for two main reasons. First, this would ease the flow trough the information-theoretic proofs and highlight the usage of the UCE factorization method for showing that Gaussian inputs achieve capacity. Second, by aggregating the machinery behind this method in a separate section we hope to facilitate its application to additional research problems in future work.
In accordance to the above, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives definitions and describes the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages. In Section III we state our main results: the secrecycapacity regions of the considered BC without and with a common message, given in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Discussions of these results and a numerical example to illustrate the obtained regions are also given in Section III. Section IV presents the various definitions and properties related to UCEs used throughout this work (with proofs relegated to Section VI). Section V contains the proofs of our main secrecy-capacity results based on the technical background supplied in Section IV. Finally, Section VII summarizes the main results and insights of this work.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
We use the following notations. The set of natural numbers (which does not include 0) is denoted by N, while R are the reals. We further define R + {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Given two real numbers a, b, we denote by [a : b] the set of integers n ∈ N a ≤ n ≤ b ; when a = 1 we use the shorthand [b] . Calligraphic letters denote sets, e.g., X , while |X | stands for the cardinality of X . X n denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element of X n is denoted by x n = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ); whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors (or sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x. The transpose and the Euclidean norm of x are denoted by x and x , respectively. Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X, with similar conventions for random vectors. All the random variables considered in this work are real valued.
Probability density functions (PDFs) are denoted by the lowercase letters p or q, with a subscript that identifies the random variable and its possible conditioning. For example, for two jointly continuous random vectors X and Y, let p X , p X,Y and p X|Y denote, respectively, the PDF of X, the joint PDF of (X, Y) and the conditional PDF of X given Y.
Expressions such as
Accordingly, when three random variables X, Y and Z satisfy p X |Y,Z = p X |Y , they form a Markov chain, which we denote by X − Y − Z . The subscripts of a PDF are omitted if its arguments are lowercase versions of the corresponding random variables. General (i.e., not necessarily continuous) probability distributions are denoted by the uppercase letters P and Q, with conventions similar to those used for PDFs. The expectation of a random variable X is EX. When a random variable X is normally distributed we write X ∼ N (μ, σ 2 ), where μ = EX is the expectation of X and σ 2 = var(X) is its variance. Similarly, an n-dimensional Gaussian distribution of dimension is defined by the expectation μ = EX ∈ R n and the covariance matrix K = E (X − μ)(X − μ) , for which we write X ∼ N (μ, K). Generally, non-italic capital letters, e.g., A, denote matrices. We use A 0 to indicate that a matrix A is positive semi-definite, while A B denotes "less than or equal to" in the positive semi-definite ordering, i.e., B − A 0. The determinant of a square matrix A is designated by |A|.
Definition 1 (Upper Concave Envelope
Another representation of the UCE C f of f relies on the supporting hyperplanes of f . Namely, for any x ∈ D, we have
B. Problem Definition
The outputs of a MIMO Gaussian BC at the i th channel use are:
where G 1 , G 2 ∈ R t ×t are channel gain matrices (assumed to be known to all parties), Z j (i ) i∈ [n] , for j = 1, 2, is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of Gaussian random vectors taking values in R t ×1 . For each j = 1, 2 and i ∈ [n], the elements of
Gaussian random variables, whose expected values and variance are specified by the parameters of the normal distribution of Z j (i ). The input sequence X(i ) i∈ [n] is subject to the covariance constraint
where K 0. We study the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages (Fig. 1) . The sender communicates three messages (M 0 , M 1 , M 2 ) over the MIMO Gaussian BC from (1) . M 0 is a common message that is intended to both users, while M j , for j = 1, 2, is delivered to user j only. The receivers are to recover their intended messages with arbitrarily small error probability. Moreover, M 1 is a confidential message that is to be kept secret from User 2, which is formally described by the weak-secrecy requirement
where n is the number of channel uses. In (3), the notation
is the output vector (taking values in R t ) observed by User 2 at the i th channel instance. For any covariance constraint K 0, the secrecy-capacity region C K is the closure of all achievable rate triples
+ , where achievability is defined in a standard manner (see, e.g., [22] [23] were originally proven under this paradigm. 1 Nonetheless, the results from [23] are readily upgraded to strong secrecy using the approach of Maurer and Wolf from [24] , while accounting for the channel being continuous in a manner similar to [25] . Since the focus of this paper is on the optimality of Gaussian inputs and computable secrecy-capacity expressions, we do not dwell on the employed notion of security.
III. SECRECY-CAPACITY RESULTS
A. MIMO Gaussian BCs With Private and Confidential Messages
The MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages but without a common message is defined as in Section II-B, while setting R 0 = 0. For any covariance constraint K 0, letĈ K be the corresponding secrecy-capacity region, and for any 0 K K set the following shorthand notations:r 1 The work [23] derived bounds on the admissible rate region of a BC with privacy leakage constraints. Zero leakage corresponds to secrecy, but since leakage can only be defined in terms of rate the resulting notion of security is weak-secrecy.
Define alsô
The following theorem characterizesĈ K . 
The proof of Theorem 1 (given in Section V-A) shows that certain inner and outer bounds of the secrecy-capacity region coincide, and that Gaussian inputs are optimal. First, we show that the boundary points of the outer bound are an UCE of a function of the input distribution. Based on some properties of UCEs (see Sections IV-A and IV-B) we deduce that a Gaussian input distribution maximizes the considered UCE. The secrecy-capacity region is then characterized by evaluating the boundary points of the inner bound under a Gaussian input vector and showing that they coincide with those of the outer bound.
Remark 
is given byĈ [21] . The simplified optimization problem is then used to illustrate the secrecy-capacity region under an average total power constraintĈ P on a numerical example.
B. MIMO Gaussian BCs With Common, Private and Confidential Messages
To state the secrecy-capacity region C K of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages as defined in Section II-B, we define
and
, and set 
Theorem 2 is proven in Section V-B. Gaussian noise when decoding its private message M 2 , which is transmitted using another (independent) Gaussian signal with covariance K 1 (see (8c)). According to (8a), the remaining portion of the total covariance matrix, that is, As before, Theorem 2 produces a characterization of the secrecy-capacity region under the average total power constraint.
Corollary 2 (Average Total Power Constraint): The secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages under the average total power constraint (7a) is given by
C P = 0 K: tr(K)≤ P C K .(11)
C. Numerical Example
We illustrate the secrecy-capacity regionĈ P of the MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages (without a common message) under an average total power constraint P (Corollary 1). The region is described in (7b) as the union of all secrecy-capacity regionsĈ K , each under a covariance constraint K 0 with tr(K) ≤ P. However,Ĉ K itself is described as matrix optimization problems that is not convex in general, and is therefore, hard to compute.
We overcome the computational inefficiency ofĈ K by leveraging the decomposition proposed in [21, eq. (10)]: Every positive semi-definite matrix K ∈ R t ×t with K K can be expressed as
where V ∈ R t ×t is a unitary matrix and D ∈ R t ×t is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal values are between 0 and 1. Since in the subsequent example the dimension is t = 2, a unitary matrix V is nothing but a rotation matrix, i.e., we set
Running over all possible diagonal matrices D involves only two parameters, viz. the diagonal entries of D. Finally, note that K 1 2 is any matrix B satisfying BB = K. Obviously, there are many such matrices (in fact if B satisfies BB = K, then so does BU, for any unitary U). However, since the numerical calculation runs over all matrices V from (13) anyway, any choice of B would do. Our simulation uses the Cholesky decomposition of K to calculate B.
The regionĈ P is computed according to (7b), while noting that one may restrict the optimization domain to positive semidefinite matrices K with tr(K) = P. This observation follows because for every K with tr(K ) = π < P, there is a K with tr(K) = P, such thatĈ The matrix K is constructed by increasing the (1, 1)-th entry of K by P − π, while all other entries of K remain unchanged. The construction satisfies K K and the inclusion in (14) follows because fixing K K K and replacing K with K in (4) does not alter (4a) and strictly increases (4b).
In the numerical example we set
and P = 12. The secrecy-capacity regionĈ P is given by the solid blue curve in Fig. 2 . For comparison, the secrecycapacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages [13] (i.e., when each user serves as the eavesdropped of the message to the other user) is depicted by the dashed red curve. As expected, Fig. 2 shows that imposing a secrecy constraint on M 2 at the 1st receiver strictly shrinks the secrecycapacity region. Although in both regions the maximal value of R 1 is the secrecy-capacity of the corresponding MIMO Gaussian WTC (see (4a) and [13, eq. (4)]), the achievable values of R 2 drop if M 2 is also confidential.
IV. OPTIMALITY OF GAUSSIAN INPUTS VIA FACTORIZATION OF CONCAVE ENVELOPES
This section provides the mathematical background for characterizing the secrecy-capacity regions of the considered MIMO Gaussian BC without and with a common message (Theorems 1 and 2). In the sequel we define some generic functions and show that they are maximized by Gaussian distributions. These functions are later used to describe the boundary points of certain outer bounds on the secrecycapacity regions of interest. The properties established in this section are leveraged to show that optimality is achieved by Gaussian inputs, and that the resulting expressions are attainable by a corresponding inner bound.
Sections IV-A and IV-B focus on functions that are reminiscent of those studied in [16, Secs. II-B and II-C]. Therefore, to avoid verbatim repetition of arguments from [16] , we state some of the properties in Sections IV-A and IV-B without proofs. The focus of is on a new function that was not considered [16, Sec. IV-C], the properties of which we prove in full detail. All the proofs for this section are relegated to Section VI.
Establishing Gaussian inputs as maximizers relies on the notion of two-letter BCs [16, Sec. I-A], which is a special case of a product BC (PBC). 2 Definition 2 
A MIMO Gaussian PBC can be represented as
where
A two-letter version of a BC is a PBC in which the components are identical, i.e., q
. In all subsequent definitions and results, the input covariance constraining matrix K 0 (see (2)) stays fixed. [16] without providing proofs. Additional attributes of s q η (X) that were not proven in [16] are rigorously derived.
A. Difference of Mutual Information Terms
Consider a BC q Y 1 ,Y 2 |X . For any η > 1, let s q η be a functional of X ∼ P X defined by s q η (X) I (X; Y 2 ) − ηI (X; Y 1 ). (17) Remark 8: The definition of s q η (X) in (17) coincides with that of s q λ (X) I (X; Y 1 ) − λI (X; Y 2 ) from [16, Sec.
II-B] (only differing in the ordering of the mutual information terms and the labeling of the parameter). Accordingly, we restate and use some of the properties of s
For a pair of random variables
and define the UCE of s
The second equality in (19) follows directly from Definition 1. For any discrete random variable V we also set S
, and naturally extend this definition (merely an expectation) for an arbitrary V .
Proposition 1 (Concave Envelopes Properties): The UCE S
, for a fixed P X , and therefore it is continuous in η at η = 1. 3 The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Section VI-A. (21) and define the quantities s 
, the following chain of inequalities holds
(22) The proof of Proposition 2 follows by repeating the steps in the proof of [16, Proposition 6] , while switching the roles of
The proof of Theorem 3 is also omitted as it mimics the proofs [16, Th.1 and Corollary 1].
B. Nested Upper Concave Envelopes
The function considered in this subsection is used to derive the secrecy-capacity region of the considered MIMO Gaussian BC without a common message (see Section V-A).
For (23) where S q η (X) is given by (19) . As before, for a pair of random variables (V, X) for which
and set
, for a V with a countable alphabet and consider its natural extension when V is an arbitrary random variable.
Remark 9 (Nested Concave Envelopes Properties): Similarly to the properties of S
, for a fixed P X , and therefore it is continuous as a function of η at η = 1.
Definition 4 (Maximized Nested Concave Envelope): For any MIMO
The proof of Proposition 3 follows by arguments similar to those in the proof of Property 3 of Proposition 1. Namely, the continuity ofV λ,η (K) at η = 1 follows by verifying thatV λ,η (K) is convex in η inside (0, 2) and using Proposition 17 from [26, Ch. 5].
As before, to state the factorization property for nested UCEs, we extend some of the preceding definitions to PBCs. For a PBC q
Furthermore, define t 
Furthermore, if the PBC is Gaussian and a triple
. See Section VI-B for the proof of Proposition 4. The existence of a Gaussian maximizer forV q λ,η (K) follows by repeating the proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 in [16] with respect to our definition of T q λ,η . The existence is stated in the following Theorem, which we give without proof.
Theorem 4 (Gaussian Maximizer): Let
X ∼ N (0, K). There exists a unique decomposition X = X 1 + X 2 + X into independent random variables (X 1 , X 2 , X ), where X j ∼ N (0, K j ), j = 1, 2, and X ∼ N (0, K − (K 1 + K 2 ) , K 1 + K 2 K, such that T q λ,η (X) = t q λ,η (X 1 + X 2 ) =V q λ,η (K) (30a) S q η (X 1 + X 2 ) = s q η (X 1 ) = V q η (K 1 + K 2 ). (30b)
C. Double-Nested Upper Concave Envelopes
The definitions and properties in this section are used to derive the secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative BC with common, private and confidential messages (as defined in
where T q λ,η (X) is given by (25) and
for a discrete V and, as before, consider its natural extension in the case where V is arbitrary.
Remark 10 (Double-Nested Concave Envelopes Properties): The concavity of F
for any fixed X, and is thus continuous at η = 1.
Definition 5 (Maximized Double-Nested Concave Envelope): For any MIMO
Remark 11 (Continuity of Maximal Value): As before, one readily verifies that as a function of η,Ṽ λ 0 ,α,η (K) is convex inside (0, 2), and deduce its continuity at η = 1.
The above notions are once again extended to PBCs. Namely, for any PBC q
and define f 
Proposition 5 (Factorization Property): For any PBC q
Furthermore, if the PBC is Gaussian and a triple (V , X 1 , X 2 ) satisfies
See Section VI-C for the proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 (Existence of a Maximizer): There exists a pair
Furthermore, one may assume that
The existence of a maximizer and the cardinality bound on V are proven in Section VI-D. A zero conditional expectation can be assumed because centering conditioned on each V = v does not change the mutual information terms and hence f q λ 0 ,α,η (X 2 |V ) remains unchanged as well. In addition, the centered versions of the input continues to satisfy the covariance constraint.
To show that the distribution that achievesṼ 
where X v 1 and X v 2 are taken to be independent random variables, i.e., ( See Section VI-F for the proof.
Corollary 3 (Gaussian Maximizer Properties): Let
There is a unique decomposition X = X 1 + X 2 + X 3 + X into independent random variables (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , X ) ,
(37c) Corollary 3, which is a consequence of Theorem 5, is our main tool for characterizing the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages. The proof of the Corollary is provided in Section VI-G.
V. PROOFS OF SECRECY-CAPACITY RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We establish the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages by showing that certain outer bound and inner bounds match. In particular, we consider special cases of the inner and outer bounds [23, Ths. 1 and 3], respectively. To state the bounds, let C denote the secrecy-capacity region of the corresponding discrete-memoryless (DM) BC.
Bound 1 (Outer Bound): LetÔ be the closure of the union of rate pairs
+ satisfying:
Bound 2 (Inner Bound): LetÎ be the closure of the union of rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 2 + satisfying:
The reader is referred to Appendix A for the proofs of Bounds 1 and 2. LetĈ K ,Ô K andÎ K denote the secrecy-capacity region, the outer bound and the inner bound for a MIMO Gaussian BC computed under a covariance input constraint E XX K. Accordingly, we havê
The opposite inclusion, i.e.,Ô K ⊆Î K , is shown next. The regionsÎ K andÔ K are closed, convex and bounded subsets of the first quadrant, and therefore, are characterized by the intersection of their supporting hyperplanes.
Lemma 1 (Supporting Hyperplanes): The following are supporting hyperplanes ofÔ K andÎ K :
Lemma 1 is proven in Appendix B. It shows that if we set 0) and (0, R 2 ) are attainable inÎ K . Consequently, to show that the regions coincide, it suffices to establish max
for λ 1 , λ 2 > 0. Observe that
where: By Theorem 4, for every η > 1, there exist independent random variables X 1 
. Moreover, setting X = X 1 + X 2 + X maximizes λ 2 I (X; Y 2 ) and attainŝ V q η (K) simultaneously. In order to conform to the notation in the bounds, let V = X . Taking the limit as η ↓ 1, we have
The following proposition is used to show that (44) is achievable withinÎ K .
Proposition 8 (Partial Dirty-Paper Coding (P-DPC))
: Fix a covariance matrix K and let X = X 1 + X 2 + V , where X 1 , X 2 and V are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices K 1 , K 2 and K − (K 1 + K 2 ), respectively, for some 0
We first write
where (a) follows by settingX X 2 + V and Z 1 G 1 X 1 + Z 1 . By the independence of X 1 , X 2 , V and Z 1 , we have thatX and Z 1 are also independent. Moreover, Z 1 ∼ N 0, I + G 1 K 1 G 1 , where the covariance matrix I + G 1 K 1 G 1 is diagonalizable (due to its symmetry) and invertible (because it is positive definite). Denoting I + G 1 K 1 G 1 , gives
where Q is a unitary matrix and is diagonal, and furthermore 
Furthermore,
Note that Y 1 → − 1 2 Y 1 is an invertible mapping, and as such, preserves mutual information. We conclude the proof as follows:
where (a) is becauseX = X 2 + V and by (50), (b) and
preserves mutual information, while (c) uses (49).
Inserting U as stated in Proposition 8 into the RHS of (44), we obtain
where (a) follows since (U , V ) − X − (Y 1 , Y 2 ) forms a Markov chain and E XX K is satisfied, which implies that the rate pair
and R 2 = I (V ; Y 2 ) belongs toÎ K . Concluding, we see that I K =Ĉ K =Ô K , which characterizes the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages.
Furthermore, equality (and hence the extreme points ofĈ K ) is achieved by Gaussian inputs as stated in Proposition 8, thus making the region computable. By evaluatingÎ K (or, equivalentlyÔ K ) with respect to this input distribution, we describe the secrecy-capacity regionĈ K as the union of rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 2 + satisfying:
where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices K 1 , K 2 , such that K 1 + K 2 K. We further simplify (53) by noting that the RHS of (53a) is the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian WTC as derived in [16, Appendix III], which is maximized by setting K 1 = 0 (see [7] - [9] ). Further note that K 1 = 0 cannot decrease the RHS of (53b). Thus, by relabeling K 2 K we establish (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
As in the case without a common message, the secrecycapacity region C K is derived by showing that certain outer bound and inner bounds on C K coincide. Denoting by C the region of the DM-BC with common, private and confidential messages, we bound it as follows.
Bound 3 (Outer Bound): Let O be the closure of the union of rate triples (R
Bound 4 (Inner Bound): Let I be the closure of the union of rate triples (R
The proofs of Bounds 3 and 4 are relegated to Appendix A. Denoting by O K and I K the adaptations of Bounds 3 and 4 to a MIMO Gaussian BC with a covariance input constraint E XX K, we have I K ⊆ C K ⊆ O K . Next, we use the factorization of UCEs method to show that the opposite inclusion O K ⊆ I K also holds. Given the supporting hyperplanes characterization of bounded and closed convex sets, using a similar reasoning as in Section V-A (see Lemma 1) , it suffices to study max
Further note that it suffices to restrict attention to the case where λ 0 > λ 2 . This follows from the following observation: If a rate triple (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) is in C K then so does the triple (0, R 1 , R 2 + R 0 ), since one may always treat the common message as part of the (non-confidential) private message to Receiver 2. Assuming λ 0 ≤ λ 2 , we have
and therefore,
whereĈ K is the secrecy-capacity region without a common message that was characterized in Section III-A. Hence, it suffices to show that for all λ j > 0, j = 1, 2, 3, with λ 0 > λ 2 , we have
Now, for any α ∈ [0, 1] setᾱ = 1 − α, and consider the following.
where: Recall that for any η > 1, λ j > 0, for j = 0, 1, 2, and λ 0 > λ 2 , Corollary 3 implies that there exist independent random variables X j ∼ N (0, K j ), j = 1, 2, 3, and X ∼ N 0, K − (K 1 + K 2 + K 3 ) , such that (37) is satisfied. Furthermore, setting X = X 1 + X 2 + X 3 + X not only attains V q η (K), but it also simultaneously maximizes αλ 0 I (X; Y 1 ) and αλ 0 I (X; Y 2 ). Relabeling W = X and V = X 3 while taking the limit as η ↓ 1, we have
Using Proposition 8, we set U = X 2 +ÃV as before and obtain
Inserting (61) into (60), yields
Since (62) holds for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
Having (63), the desired equality O K = I K is a consequence of the following Proposition. 4 
Proposition 9 (Max-Min Interchanging): The following max-min interchanging holds
(64) The proof of Proposition 9 is given in Appendix D. Now, noting that (W, V, U ) − X − (Y 1 , Y 2 ) forms a Markov chain and E XX K, we see that the triple 
is inside the inner bound I K . Hence
which implies thatÎ K =Ĉ K =Ô K and characterizes the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages.
To obtain the description of C K stated in (10) , note that when λ 0 > λ 2 , equality (and hence the extreme points of C K ) is achieved by setting
are independent of each other, and U = X 2 +ÃV , whereÃ is the P-DPC matrix from Proposition 8. For the case when λ 0 ≤ λ 2 , (56)- (57) imply that the boundary-achieving input distribution corresponds to the one that achieves the secrecy-capacity region when there is no common message (see Section V-A). Setting K 3 = K − (K 1 + K 2 ) recovers the optimal input distribution for the case without common message. By evaluating I K (or, equivalently O K ) with respect to (66), we characterize the secrecy-capacity region C K as the union of rate triples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 3 + satisfying:
where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices
The region from (67) is further simplified using reasoning similar to this from Section V-A. First, (67b) indicates that the signal to User 1 is a sum of two independent zero mean Gaussian random vector with covariance K 1 and K 2 . The signal that corresponds to K 2 carries the confidential message M 1 , while the K 1 signal is an artificial noise sent (on purpose) to confuse User 2 (which serves as an eavesdropper of M 1 ). The lack of structure in the artificial noise adds to the noise floor at both receivers (see also [13, Remark 4] ).
However, since the RHS of (67b) is the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian WTC, it is maximized by setting K 1 = 0. Furthermore, since in both (67a) and (67c) K 1 serves as noise (i.e., it is not used to encode any of the messages), setting K 1 = 0 achieves optimality. This is since K 1 = 0 corresponds to revealing the K 1 signal to both receivers, which can only increase the transmission rates. Taking K 1 = 0 and recasting K 3 as K 1 , recovers (10).
VI. PROOFS OF UPPER CONCAVE ENVELOPES PROPERTIES
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Property 1 follows by Jensen's inequality since S q η is concave in P X , while for Property 2 we use the fact that P X|W,V = P X|V . To prove Property 3, fix P X and let
Clearly, S q η (X) is also bounded for every η ∈ (0, 2) and by invoking Proposition 17 from [26, Ch. 5], we have that S q η (X) is continuous inside every closed subinterval of (0, 2), and in particular, at η = 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
where: (a) is since given V we have the Markov chain (Y 11 , 
The end-to-end equality in (68) also gives
where (a) follows because (69) implies that the chain
C. Proof of Proposition 5
Let For (V , X 1 , X 2 ) that satisfy (35), an end-to-end equality holds in (71), implying that I (Y 11 ; Y 22 |V ) = 0. Invoking [16, Proposition 2], we deduce that X 1 − V − X 2 forms a Markov chain, which further implies the Markov chain
By the end-to-end equality in (68), we also have
where (a) uses (72), which implies that
D. Proof of Proposition 6
A key arguments in the proof of Proposition 6 is the continuity of the nested UCE T q λ,η (X) = Ct q λ,η (X) in P X . We shall establish this continuity using [16, Proposition 21 ], which we reproduced as follows.
Proposition 10 (Boundedness and Continuity of UCE):
Consider the space of all Borel probability distributions on R t endowed with the topology induced by weak convergence. 5 Let X n n∈N be a sequence of random variable that satisfies the following two properties: respectively. This notion of convergence is denoted by X n 
Let X n n∈N be a sequence of random variables with
By [16, Proposition 17] and since E X n X n =K for every n ∈ N, we have that X n n∈N is a tight sequence, 6 and that there exist an X K and a convergent subsequence 
By the definition ofṼ
SinceṼ q λ 0 ,α,η (K) is a convex combination as above, to obtain the maximizer subject to the covariance constraint it suffices to restrict attention to the family of maximizers
It takes
constraints to preserve the covariance matrix (due to its symmetry) and one other constraint to preserve i α iṽ q λ 0 ,α,η (K). Hence, by using the Bunt-Carathedory theorem [28] , we can restrict ourselves to convex combinations of at most m t (t +1) 2 + 1 points, i.e.,
Consider any sequence of convex combinations α
that approaches the supremum 6 As defined in [16] , a sequence of random variables X n n∈N taking values in R t is tight if for every > 0 there exists a compact set C ⊂ R t , such that P X n / ∈ C ≤ , ∀n ∈ N.
as n → ∞. 
Based on Lemma 4, we assume that α min i∈ [m] 
, for large enough n. Hence, for each i ∈ [m] we can find a convergent subsequence K
Putting these together, we havẽ
i.e., one can always find a pair of random variables (V , X ) with |V | ≤
E. Proof of Proposition 7
Denote q Y 1 ,Y 2 |X q and consider the two-letter BC q(y 11 , y 21 |x 1 ) × q(y 12 , y 22 |x 2 ). We have 
where we have denoted
Since the extremes of the chain of inequalities in (80) match, all inequalities are, in fact, equalities. Equality in 
F. Proof of Theorem 5
As a consequence of Proposition 7, for any fixed (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V 2 , X v 1 + X v 2 and X v 1 − X v 2 are independent. Combined with X v 1 and X v 2 being independent zero mean random variables, Corollary 3 in Appendix I-A of [16] implies that X v 1 and X v 2 are Gaussian random vectors with the same covariance matrix. Since the pair (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V 2 is arbitrary, we see that all Gaussian vectors {X v } v∈V have the same covariance matrix. Furthermore, we may assume that {X v } v∈V are all centered, and therefore, we get that this is an i.i.d. set of Gaussian random variables. Denoting this common covariance matrix by K , it clearly satisfies K K. Letting X ∼ N (0, K ), we haveṼ
where ( To account for the uniqueness of the zero-mean maximizer we first show that if a zero mean random vector X is a maximizer, i.e.,Ṽ q λ 0 ,α,η (K) = f q λ 0 ,α,η (X), it must be Gaussian. Let X 1 and X 1 be two i.i.d. copies of X. Applying Proposition 7 while taking V to be a constant, we obtain that X 1 + X 2 and X 1 − X 2 are also independent. Hence, by [16, Corollary 3] , X is Gaussian.
Next, suppose thatṼ q λ 0 ,α,η (K) has two independent Gaussian maximizers denoted by 
(K).
On the other hand,
where (a) follows since X − X − (Y 1 , Y 2 ) forms a Markov chain, while (b) follows because X X = x ∼ X +x . Thus,
By Theorem 4, one can decompose X into independent
The proof of existence is concluded by setting
, which implies that (37) holds. The uniqueness of the decomposition (i.e., of the covariance matrices K 1 , K 2 and K 3 ) is a direct consequence of Theorems 3, 4 and 5.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two-user MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages was studied. The private message to Receiver 1 is confidential and kept secret from Receiver 2. The secrecy-capacity region without a common message was characterized first and Gaussian inputs were shown to achieve optimality. The proof relied on establishing an equivalence between certain inner and outer bounds using factorization of UCEs [16] and a variant of DPC [20] . Our results showed that using DPC to cancel out the signal of the non-confidential message at Receiver 1 exhausts the entire region, making DPC against the signal of the confidential message unnecessary.
This secrecy-capacity region without a common message was then used to characterize a portion of the region with a common message. The rest of the region was found using double-nested UCEs. The secrecy-capacity region without a common message was illustrated using a numerical example. To make the region (efficiently) computable, matrix decomposition properties from [21] were leveraged. The region was shown to be strictly larger than the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages (in which each private message is kept secret from the opposite user).
APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF INNER AND OUTER BOUNDS
A. Outer Bounds 1 and 3
We first establish Bound 3 as an outer bound on the secrecycapacity region of the setting with a common message, and then use it to establish Bound 1 as an outer bound on the region without a common message.
The result of [23, Th. 3] characterizes an outer bound L 2 )-leakage-capacity region of a DM-BC with common and private messages, for some leakage L 2 ) (which corresponds to M 1 being confidential and M 2 not being subject to any secrecy requirements), we have that the closure of the union of rate triples
+ satisfying: 
and definingṼ = (W, V ).
B. Inner Bounds 2 and 4
Referring to [23, Th. 1], we have R I (0, ∞) as an inner bound on C, where R I (0, ∞) is the closure of the union of rate triples (R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ R 3 + satisfying:
immediately follows by noting that if (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfy (55) then they also satisfy (89). A simple consequence of the above is that Bound 2 is an inner bound on the secrecy-capacity region without a common message, which follows by setting R 0 = 0 and W = 0 into Bound 4. [7] - [9] ),
To see that (H K 1 , 0) is also inÎ K consider the following. For every 0 K K, let X 1 and X 2 be independent Gaussian random vectors with covariances K and K − K , respectively. Set
Evaluating the mutual information terms on the RHS of (39a), we first have
Moreover,
where (a) follows because (X 1 , Z 2 ) and X 2 are independent. Combining (91) with (92) yields 
A. Proof of Lemma 2
By Theorem 4, we have that if E XX K, then
where X = X 1 + X 2 , and X 1 and X 2 are independent random variables with
Furthermore, by the definition of the UCE and the definition ofV q λ,η (K), (94) implies that for every X ∼ P X with E XX K, we have
Thus,
where (a) is by Theorem 4, while (b) follows from an adaptation of [16, Proposition 19 ] to the function s q η (X) as defined in (17) , which implies that for η > 1 there exists a C η , such that s q η (X) ≤ C η , for all P X (see Remark 8) . By (96), we have
where (a) is by setting λ λ 1 +λ 2 λ 1 > 1. To bound the last two terms, we use the min-max theorem on eigenvalues: Let μ i (A) be the i th smallest eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix A ∈ R t ×t , we have
where L i is an i -dimensional subspace of R t . Since the tdimensional subspace of R t is unique (that is, L t = R t ), we obtain
The RHSs of (100) imply that for every non-zero u ∈ R t we have μ 1 (A) ≤ u Au u u ≤ μ t (A). We upper and lower bound the i th eigenvalue of K + j , for j = 1, 2, as follows
Hence the eigenvalues of K + j , j = 1, 2, satisfy
where i ∈ [t]. We now bound the last two terms in (98) as
where (a) follows from by (101), and (b) is by setting μ = max 0, 
We thus conclude that
where (a) and (b) follow from (105) and (106), respectively, while (c) follows by denoting the eigenvalues of G 2 KG 2 by {μ j } t j =1 .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
The proof relies on a result from [27, Corollary 2], which we reproduce in the following.
Proposition 11 (Min-Max Interchange): Let
i=1 λ i = 1 be the d-dimensional simplex. Let P be a set of distribution P U over a set U. Let g i : P → R i∈ [d] be a set of functionals such that
is a convex set. Then
Let d = 2 and P be the set of PDFs P W,V ,U,X that satisfy E XX K. Set 
and consider the corresponding set A from (108). To show that A is convex, let (a 1 , a 2 ), (b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ A and P a , P b ∈ P be for all (w, v, u, x) ∈ W × V × U × X n . First note that
where E Q denotes that an expectation is taken with respect to Q. This implies that P ∈ P. Next, by evaluating g i , i = 1, 2, with respect to P, we have
implying that α(a 1 , a 2 ) +ᾱ(b 1 , b 2 ) ∈ A, which establishes the convexity of A. In the above, I P indicates that a mutual information term is taken with respect to an underlying distribution P. The proof of Proposition 9 is completed by invoking is attained by either α = 0 or α = 1. 
